经济政策不确定性与上市公司股权激励

陈胤默　张明　文雯　任莉莉[1]

摘要　宏观层面的经济政策不确定性对微观企业决策行为的影响引起了学术界的广泛关注。本文采用2006—2017年沪深A股上市公司数据，实证研究经济政策不确定性对上市公司股权激励的影响。研究发现，经济政策不确定性越高，上市公司越有可能实施股权激励，并且股权激励的实施力度也相应增大。进一步研究发现，由于企业风险承担行为中存在代理问题，经济政策不确定性的上升导致企业外部风险加大，因此代理冲突更加严重的上市公司更有可能在经济政策不确定性上升时实施股权激励，进而激发管理层工作的积极性。同时，经济政策不确定性越高，上市公司实施股权激励的有效期越短，并且越有可能推出限制性的股票激励方式。在采用倾向得分匹配法、控制潜在的内生性问题以及采用替代指标进行稳健性检验后，结果依然成立。本文拓展了宏观经济政策不确定性的经济后果以及上市公司股权激励影响因素的研究，在企业应对不确定性的冲击方面具有政策启示意义。

关键词　经济政策不确定性　股权激励　代理问题

Economic Policy Uncertainty and Listed Companies' Equity-based Incentives

YINMO CHEN　MING ZHANG　WEN WEN　LILI REN

Abstract　The impact of macro-economic policy uncertainty on the decisions of micro companies has drawn much attention in academia. Using Chinese A-share listed companies' data from2006 to 2017, this study investigates the effect of economic policy uncertainty on equity-based incentives of listed companies.This study finds that the possibility companies implement equity-based incentives and the intensity of equity-based incentives implementation both increase with the raise of economic policy uncertainty. Further study reveals that due to the existence of the agency problem of corporate risk-taking, the increase of economic policy uncertainty increases listed companies' operational risk exposure, thus the impact of economic policy uncertainty on listed companies' equity-based incentives are more pronounced in firms with serious agency problems. In addition, when the economic policy uncertainty increases, firms are more likely to adopt shorter period equity-based incentives and use restricted stock option incentives. Our result is robust after employing the propensity score matching approach, controlling potential endogenous problem and using alternative measures. This study extends the literature on the economic consequence of economic policy uncertainty and determinants of equity-based incentives. This study also has policy implications to guide companies to deal with the shock of uncertainty.

Key words　Economic Policy Uncertainty；Equity-based Incentives；Agency Problem